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Member of the California Bar, Partner, McCutchen. Doyle Brown & Ener-
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Commentary will summarize some of the principal rules and
standards through which the United States antitrust laws are applied to
business transacted overseas.
For over forty years, United States law has been applied to transac-
tions abroad. The rationale is that these transactions have "effects"
within the United States. A review of the case law and legislative history
demonstrates, however, that the "effects requirement" has evolved signif-
icantly over the past forty years. In fact, the most recent amendments to
the antitrust laws reflect congressional desire to limit the application of
those laws to United States businesses.
II. GENERAL RULES AND STANDARDS FOR
APPLYING UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS
TO OVERSEAS TRANSACTIONS
The United States antitrust laws include the Sherman,' Clayton,2
Robinson-Patman,3 and Federal Trade Commission Acts.4 Because
these laws are stated broadly, their meaning must be ascertained by an
* © 1984, James P. Kleinberg.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). Originally passed in 1890, the Sherman Act prohibits collu-
sion and conspiracies among competitors, prohibits monopolies and attempts to monopolize,
and can result in criminal and civil sanctions.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982). Originally passed in 1914, the Clayton Act includes spe-
cific prohibitions against certain distribution practices (exclusive dealing and product tying),
and mergers and acquisitions which have an "adverse effect" on competition.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1982). Originally passed in 1936, the Robinson-Patman
Act is an amendment to the Clayton Act and deals principally with narrowly defined practices
of price differentials in the sale of goods, the most common being "price discrimination and
rebates."
4. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). This Act empowers the Federal Trade Commission to enjoin
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analysis of the case law. The facts, rather than general principles, deter-
mine the results in each case. Consequently, even the "clearest" lan-
guage, such as the word "every" in section 1 of the Sherman Act, has
been subject to interpretation and re-interpretation. In short, the statutes
mean what the courts say they mean, and their meanings have changed
over time.
The first Supreme Court decision on the extraterritorial application
of the antitrust laws resulted in a rigid and inflexible rule. In American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,' Justice Holmes held that the Sherman
Act did not apply to transactions outside the United States:
[T]he acts causing the damage were done, so far as appears, outside the
jurisdiction of the United States. . . .It is surprising to hear it argued
that they were governed by the act of Congress .. . .[T]he general
and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or
unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where
the act is done.6
Not surprisingly, this terse statement did not provide a satisfactory
answer to many complex problems arising in international commerce
and, therefore, was gradually undermined. The result of this process was
the landmark decision, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, in
which Judge Learned Hand examined the economic effects of foreign
conduct in the United States. Judge Hand concluded that if these eco-
nomic effects were "intended" by the parties, the United States would
have jurisdiction under the antitrust laws.8
Since Alcoa, this "effects" test has been analyzed and modified. The
major case construing the "effects" test is Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of America, N. T. & S.A. 9 In Timberlane, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals stated the "effects" test was "by itself... incomplete because
it fail[ed] to consider other nations' interests" or the relationship between
the parties and the United States."' To cure these deficiencies, the court
prescribed a three-part test for applying American antitrust principles:
(1) is there some effect on American foreign commerce? (2) is the alleged
restraint "of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a viola-
"[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce" and "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce."
5. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
6. Id. at 355-56.
7. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
8. Id. at 443-44.
9. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
10. Id. at 611-12.
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tion of the Sherman Act?"' I and (3) "[a]s a matter of international com-
ity and fairness, should the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United
States be asserted?"' 2 With respect to the third element, the court sug-
gested that all of the following factors must be weighed:
[i] the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, [ii] the nationality
or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of busi-
ness of corporations, [iii] the extent to which enforcement by either
state can be expected to achieve compliance, [iv] the relative signifi-
cance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere,
[v] the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce, [vi] the foreseeability of such effect, and [vii]
the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the
United States as compared with conduct abroad.1
3
The complex analysis suggested by Timberlane seems to have in-
spired other circuits to new and idiosyncratic views of the "effects" test.
For example, the Third Circuit affirmed the vitality of Alcoa but held
that in determining whether jurisdiction should be exercised the trial
court should "balance" the Timberlane factors "against our nation's le-
gitimate interest in regulating anticompetitive conduct."' 4 Similarly, the
Seventh Circuit ruled that subject matter jurisdiction should be deter-
mined under Alcoa but that the court then "should consider additional
factors not set out in Timberlane."'5 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit was
opposed to the notion of discretionary jurisdiction, holding that the
courts should not apply antitrust laws if such application "would violate
principles of comity, conflicts of law, or international law.' 6 The Sec-
ond Circuit also expressed concern that a court using the Timberlane
analysis might premise jurisdiction on only minor effects on United
States commerce.17
To provide a clear and reasonable test, the Antitrust Division of the
11. rd. at 615.
12. Id.
13. Id at 614. In a subsequent decision in the same case, the Ninth Circuit recently af-
firmed the original Timberlane analysis and granted a defendant's motion to dismiss under the
third prong of that analysis. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th
Cir. 1984). After an extensive review of the seven factors defining "international comity and
fairness," the court concluded that although the restraint affected the foreign commerce of the
United States in a manner cognizable under the Sherman Act, "[t]he potential for conflict %ith
Honduran economic policy and commercial law is great [and] (tihe effect on the foreign com-
merce of the United States is minimal." Id at 1386.
14. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979).
15. Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1254-56 (7th Cir. 1980).
16. Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884 (5th Cir. 1981).
17. National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1982).
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United States Department of Justice published the Antitrust Guide for
International Operations (Guide) in 1977.18 The Guide states that "a
substantial and foreseeable effect on United States commerce" should be
required to invoke jurisdiction.' 9 Most recently, in 1982, the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act provided that the Sherman Act shall
apply to foreign trade only where "such conduct has a direct, substantial
and reasonably foreseeable effect" on United States domestic or import
trade, or on the export trade of a person engaged in such trade in the
United States. 20
The precise impact of this amendment has yet to be determined.
As of this writing, the only reported decision relying directly on the 1982
statute is Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer, Inc.2 2 In that case, the district
court held that jurisdiction did not lie under United States antitrust laws
where the plaintiff "failed to allege any facts demonstrating a causal con-
nection between defendants' conduct in Europe and the price increase [of
certain pharmaceuticals] in the United States."' 23 The court went on to
state:
Plaintiff has not and apparently cannot allege that defendants' conduct
has prevented the import of foreign manufactured Vibramycin into the
United States or prevented United States companies other than Pfizer,
Inc. from manufacturing and selling the drug in the United States. In-
deed, plaintiff has made no allegations whatsoever regarding the manu-
facture, sale or marketing of Vibramycin in the United States other
than its allegation that the United States price has increased. Thus the
18. ANTITRUST DIVISION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST
GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977) [hereinafter cited as GUIDE].
19. GUIDE, supra note 18, at 6.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982). This statute provides as follows:
§ 6a. Conduct involving trade or commerce with foreign nations
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or com-
merce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless-
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign
nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person
engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of
this title, other than this section.
If sections I to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the operation
of paragraph (1)(B), then sections I to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct only
for injury to export business in the United States.
21. The Federal Trade Commission Act was amended in 1982 to comply with the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (1982).
22. 593 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
23. Id. at 1107.
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link between defendants' conduct abroad and the price of Vibramycin
in the United States is far from apparent.
Plaintiff has utterly failed to establish that defendants' alleged for-
eign price-fixing and market allocation scheme resulted in an anticom-
petitive effect on United States domestic or import commerce. This is
precisely the type of case Congress sought to eliminate from United
States antitrust jurisdiction when it amended the Sherman Act in 1982
to "more clearly establish when antitrust liability attaches to interna-
tional business activities".... Accordingly, this Court grants defend-
ants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 4
Title III of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982,1 another
recent statute affecting the antitrust laws, has created a procedure by
which a party engaged in export trade may obtain partial immunity from
the antitrust laws. To obtain partial immunity, the party requests a "Cer-
tificate of Review" from the Secretary of Commerce. The certificate must
be granted if the applicant's activities will:
(1) result in neither a substantial lessening of competition or restraint
of trade within the United States nor a substantial restraint of the ex-
port trade of any competitor of the applicant,
(2) not unreasonably enhance, stabilize, or depress prices within the
United States of the goods, wares, merchandise, or services of the class
exported by the applicant,
(3) not constitute unfair methods of competition against competitors
engaged in the export of goods, wares, merchandise, or services of
the class exported by the applicant, and
(4) not include any act that may reasonably be expected to result in
the sale for consumption or resale within the United States of the
goods, wares, merchandise, or services to be exported.
2 6
The Secretary of Commerce may not issue a certificate until the Attorney
General agrees that the above standards are met. The Secretary must
publish notice of the application in the Federal Register and must act
within ninety days of receiving the application. All grants, denials,
amendments, revocations, and modifications of Certificates of Review are
subject to judicial review.
If the Certificate of Review is granted, the certificate holder is pro-
tected against criminal liability and treble-damages under the antitrust
laws for all conduct specified in the certificate occurring while the certifi-
24. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2492 (remarks of Chairman Rodino)).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021 (1982).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 4013(a) (1982).
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cate is in effect. This protection does not apply, however, where the cer-
tificate is obtained by fraud.2 7
III. PROBLEMS IN EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION
Cartels, vertical restraints, joint ventures, acquisitions, and mergers
have always presented problems of the extraterritorial application of the
antitrust laws. About thirty years ago, the Justice Department brought a
series of cases against private cartels in which a United States firm was
involved. The cases were never clearly resolved. Today, the House Re-
port to the 1982 Improvements Act suggests that antitrust jurisdiction
might lie where a cartel's actions have a "spillover effect" on United
States prices.
Vertical restraints in foreign distribution between supplier and cus-
tomer, which frequently take the form of "exclusive dealing" or "require-
ments contracts," generally do not violate the antitrust laws. Thus, in
the words of the Department of Justice's Guide:
The appointment of an exclusive foreign distributor by an Ameri-
can firm does not by itself raise U[nited] S[tates] antitrust concerns.
That is essentially a customer-supplier relationship which does not
necessarily have a direct impact on either the U[nited] S[tates] domes-
tic market or the export opportunities of other U[nited] S[tates]
firms.
2 8
The apparent laxity with which antitrust principles are applied to
vertical restraints may have been derived from Continental T. V, Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc. 29 In Continental, the Supreme Court held that non-
price vertical restraints were to be judged according to the rule of reason
and, thus, business considerations would apply in determining whether a
violation had occurred. It must be stressed, however, that related legal
issues such as those rules governing the termination of distributors in
foreign countries are significant, and those laws should be carefully
reviewed.
With reference to joint ventures, the 1982 amendments are geared
to reducing the likelihood these arrangements will be challenged. This
aim has practical support from the United States Justice Department
which states in its Guide:
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021 (1982).
28. GUIDE, aupra note 18, at 46.
29. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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Normally, the Department would not challenge a merger or joint
venture whose only effect was to reduce competition among the parties
in a foreign market, even where goods or services were being exported
from the United States. The rules are even less stringent where a lim-
ited "one shot" type of venture is involved creating a special limited
competitor for a special limited purpose.3
0
Certain types of joint ventures are susceptible to antitrust challenge.
These include joint ventures in which one of the parties is a potential
entrant into the market and is precluded from entry as a result of the
joint venture. The joint venture is particularly vulnerable when it exists
between competitors and precludes entry into a United States market.31
In the case of acquisitions and mergers, section 7 of the Clayton Act
has been applied to acquisitions by a United States firm of a foreign firm,
by a foreign firm of a United States firm, and by a foreign firm of a for-
eign firm. In all of these situations, the Clayton Act requires a showing
that competition may be substantially lessened. Some exemptions to this
requirement may apply and can be found in the reporting requirements
of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.
IV. EXCEPTIONS AND DEFENSES
A number of defenses are available to international business entities
which are challenged under the United States antitrust laws. One such
defense is sovereign immunity.
A foreign sovereign has long been immune from suit in the United
States. In 1976, however, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act estab-
lished that immunity does not extend to litigation arising out of "com-
mercial activity" in the United States. The definition of "commercial
activity," therefore, became extremely important in determining the
existence of sovereign immunity.
The courts have deemed "commercial" such diverse activities as a
government's purchase of cement on the open market and the sale of golf
carts by a government trade association. Notably, a district court found
price-fixing by OPEC immune because the price-fixing related to the
terms and conditions for the "removal of natural resources," rather than
to the "commercial" venture. On appeal, however, the court of appeals
applied the "act of state" doctrine and avoided deciding the case on
30. GUIDE, supra note 18, at 21.
31. In re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174 (1979), affd as modified sub noma. Yamaha
Motor Co. v. F.T.C., 657 F.2d 971 (8th cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
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"4commercial" versus "non-commercial" grounds.32
The act of state doctrine differs from sovereign immunity in that it
establishes a conclusive presumption that certain acts by a foreign gov-
ernment are valid. The basic rule is that one country will not sit in judg-
ment on the acts of another country's government. The doctrine has
been recognized in cases involving nationalization of property, foreign
policy considerations, and matters of public policy. "Ministerial" acts by
a government, however, will not be adequate to invoke the doctrine.
Compulsion may serve as a defense when a party defendant claims
that it was forced to undertake certain anticompetitive acts by a foreign
government. A recent example of a case in which the defense was raised,
although unsuccessfully, is In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation.33
Although the court in Uranium Antitrust found governmental involve-
ment, it held there was insufficient compulsion.
Difficult constitutional questions can also arise when the executive
branch imposes restraints or quotas. The issue of presidential authority
to impose restrictions was raised during the litigation over steel import
quotas but never resolved. One area where presidential authority remains
largely unchallenged is national defense. At the request of the President,
businesses may be granted immunity from the antitrust laws.34
Another defense to the antitrust laws is the Noerr-Pennington Doc-
trine. This doctrine permits parties to bring lawsuits and petition and
lobby legislative bodies without fear that their actions will violate the
antitrust laws.35 Sometimes, lobbying is exempted from the antitrust
laws by statutes such as the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 and
the Webb-Pomerene Act. The Webb-Pomerene Act also provides a lim-
ited exemption from the Sherman Act for associations formed solely for
the purpose of engaging in export trade and requires these associations to
register and file reports with the Federal Trade Commission.36 Should
the associations' actions interfere with domestic competition or restrain
the export trade of domestic competitors, the exemption does not apply.
32. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553
(C.D. Cal. 1979), affd on other grounds, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U,S,
1163 (1982).
33. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
34. See Defense Production Act of 1950, ch. 932, Pub. L. No. 774, § 708, 64 Stal, 798,
818-19 (1950).
35. Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1983). See Continen-
tal Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) and GuImi, supra note 18,
at 63.
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982).
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V. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST LITIGATION
The test applied for jurisdiction over antitrust matters is familiar:
(1) an affirmative act by the defendant establishing "minimum contacts"
with the jurisdiction, and (2) fairness and reasonableness in requiring the
defendant to come into the forum and defend. Like the jurisdiction test,
the venue provisions are traditional. Section 4 of the Clayton Act pro-
vides that venue is proper at defendant's "residence, where defendant is
found, or has an agent," and section 12 provides that a corporation may
be sued where "it may be found or transacts business." The general
venue statute 7 which provides that an "alien may be sued in any dis-
trict," may also serve as a basis for antitrust venue.
The problems involved in antitrust litigation become more serious
once discovery commences. Despite the existence of various conventions
and treaties, obtaining documents from abroad for litigation in the
United States remains difficult.3 8 For example, "blocking statutes"' are
designed to frustrate discovery requests from United States litigation.
In spite of difficulties with discovery and recent restrictions on ex-
traterritorial application, the antitrust laws maintain their vitality in
proper cases. A recent example is Laker Ainvays, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines,39 in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia was faced with conflicting orders under the laws of United States
and Great Britain. Laker brought an antitrust action against its competi-
tors in the United States district court and obtained an injunction re-
straining its competitors from taking actions designed to prevent the
court from hearing the antitrust case. British Airways and British Cale-
donian, two of the defendants, obtained an order from the Secretary of
State for Trade and Industry of the United Kingdom enjoining Laker
from proceeding on its antitrust claims. Faced with this conflict, the
United States court of appeals upheld the district court's injunction. In a
lengthy opinion, the court noted that the British actions were designed
solely to thwart the United States antitrust suit and that, based on "prin-
ciples of comity and concurrent jurisdiction,"' the United States district
court's injunction against foreign interference should stand.4 1
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1982).
38. See Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, opened for signature March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444.
39. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
40. Id. at 930.
41. Id at 916.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Through narrow applications of the "effects" test, the upholding of
key defenses and exceptions by the courts, and a more flexible attitude by
Congress and the executive branch, the impact of United States antitrust
laws on overseas business transactions seems to be on the wane. Whether
this is a part of a general de-emphasis of the antitrust laws in the 1980's
or relates strictly to international business remains to be seen.
